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ANNA BON

Capital.

Right, or on the Shelf

By
Anna Bon
Category
Capital
Form
Essay
Length
13 min read
Published
2026-09-23

You cannot buy a classic Kinder Surprise in the United States.

The toy inside is a choking hazard, customs seizes them by the thousand, and an attempt to bring one in carries a $300 fine. The manufacturer did not sue. It did not hire lobbyists to argue that the rule was out of date. It did not write a single column about the injustice of it. It cut the egg in half.

Chocolate in one half, the toy in the other, separately. Formally that is no longer a sweet with an object inside; it is two things in one package. The rule stood, and the product went on the shelf, where Kinder Joy has been selling across America since 2017. The whole distance between we are right and we are on the shelf turned out to be one plastic divider. Ukraine is having the same argument with Washington, and has not cut the egg yet.

I have spent two weeks thinking about Americans, and especially since Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff came to Kyiv. While I was finishing this, they were all in a room together again, this time in New York at the UN General Assembly. The President met Trump; Witkoff, Kushner, Secretary of State Rubio and Treasury Secretary Bessent were beside him. Note the last name. At a table about a war there is a finance minister.

This is the country we have spent almost five years trying to reach agreement with, and I am increasingly sure the problem is not our arguments. Our arguments are excellent. The problem is that Ukraine and Europe talk to America as though Americans were slightly richer Europeans, as though it were a larger Europe. It is not Europe, and it is not about that at all.

A European official walks into the room with a norm. There is law, there is procedure, there is principle. First we establish that we are right, and from that the decision is supposed to follow by itself. An American walks in with four questions. What do you want. What do I get. Who pays. What happens in ten years.

We speak about historical justice; they ask what you are offering. We explain why we need it; they answer: understood, and what is in it for us. We speak about law; they ask who enforces it. We speak about sacrifice; they price risk.

It is tempting to call that cynicism. It is not. It is a different culture, one in which counting is a form of respect. If someone is pricing your project, they are taking you seriously. Taking offence at being counted is roughly like taking offence at a doctor for ordering tests instead of sympathising.

You do not have to love America. You have to understand it.

Whether we like it or not, Moscow worked that out long ago. The Kremlin has spent decades studying the American political system — not loving it, understanding it. How the institutions work. Who has leverage over whom. What that system accepts as an argument at all.

In New York, Rubio and Lavrov met behind closed doors: no statements, no cameras, no detail afterwards. On the same day fifty-one countries signed a joint demand that Russia stop firing and return deported Ukrainian children. One room collects signatures. The other room holds the conversation. You have to work in both, not only in the one where they applaud you.

The American handwriting is recognisable, and it is not new. From Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy after the 1973 war to the far harder structures at Dayton, the same principle holds: a problem too large to solve with one beautiful document is broken into smaller agreements whose performance can be checked. Who does what. Who controls. Who verifies. What happens if it is broken. Ukraine is not Bosnia and not the Middle East, and someone else's territorial model cannot be transplanted onto us. The method can.

Now the price of the question. Every second of this war costs the Ukrainian budget about $2,200. The chair of the parliamentary budget committee put a day at roughly $190 million, not counting partner weapons; in 2024 it was 140. In eight months of this year, security and defence took almost $42 billion, of which our own revenue and domestic borrowing covered 39. The war has become so expensive that we cannot cover even our own share.

So count with me. A month at the table with no result costs us about six billion dollars. Not metaphorically. Six billion. Every round that ended in nothing carries a price tag; it is simply not shown on the news. And the highest price we pay is counted in people, not money.

Then look at next year. The draft budget puts defence and security at 4.885 trillion hryvnia, around $110 billion — 66.8 per cent of all state spending. Two thirds. External support needed: $52.6 billion. Confirmed so far: twenty. The war is ceasing to be a line in our budget. It is becoming its architecture.

And while we argue about how independent we are, Europe announced €3.3 billion for our missiles and drones this week, and the money physically arrived. I am grateful. Gratitude should not get in the way of arithmetic. A country whose defence depends on a vote in someone else's parliament has sovereignty. It does not yet have agency.

The illustration arrived the next day. The European Union extended individual sanctions against Russians for three years instead of the usual six months, which is good news, and in the same package lifted them from Usmanov and Fridman. We did not take that decision. We read the result.

On 13 September, at the YES forum in Kyiv, Kushner said it plainly: Putin has drawn the line he wants to reach; if Ukraine were willing to pull back to it, the rest of the deal would already be assembled; Ukraine does not want to do that. Read it slowly. The whole construction of peace, in the words of the man assembling it, rests on one thing.

Here is the part that will not be popular. An automatic no to every American proposal is not a position. It is a refusal to have the conversation before the terms are known. And an automatic yes is not a conversation at all. A proposal that does not suit us has to be taken apart, shown exactly where it fails, and answered with our own version. It is boring. It is slow. It is the only thing that has ever worked.

Sovereignty, the safety of people and the country's independence are not assets for exchange. Everything else is a subject for negotiation. The difference between those two sentences is what we have to be able to explain in English.

It is worth adding one dull obstacle, because rumour runs ahead of it. Article 157 of our Constitution forbids amending it under martial law, and separately forbids amendments aimed at breaking territorial integrity; Article 73 puts any change of territory to a national referendum. For once the bureaucracy works for us. A peace plan can be rewritten overnight. A constitution cannot.

Now the part that concerns you directly. On 16 September the Federal Reserve raised its rate, unanimously, for the first time since 2023, because American inflation is above target. The next day our own central bank went to 16 per cent. In both countries that means the same thing: credit gets more expensive. On 13 and 14 September Trump publicly asked Ukraine to stop striking Russian refineries, and the reason he gave was the price of diesel in the United States.

Put it together and the picture is simple. A war that is a question of survival for us became, for the American voter this autumn, a question of the price at the pump. Trump opened his meeting with the President not with the front line but with strikes on refining and what they do to fuel prices. That is the agenda into which we have to learn to write our own security.

And here is the part not to miss. Someone who urgently needs a result before November can be offered a great deal. But only by someone who arrives with their own numbers. Whoever arrives empty-handed is handed someone else's document to sign.

Fair enough, you will say: the diagnosis is clear, so what would you put on that table? One page. Americans respect a person who fits a proposal onto one page; if you need forty slides, you have not yet worked out what you are selling. It would not open with how much money we need. It would carry three lines. What America gets. What it risks. Who in Ukraine answers if something goes wrong. And a figure under each line, not an adjective.

Because a peace in which nobody has built anything holds exactly until the first provocation. A peace in which someone has already put money into a power plant or a data centre is watched far more carefully. People guard their own money better than any convention. But an investor does not only read the news from the front. They also read the news about our own security services settling scores at gunpoint, about corruption, about lawlessness. After that they stop asking about returns and start asking who is actually in charge here.

The mechanism exists, at least on paper. There is the US–Ukraine investment fund, and on 7 January the American DFC opened a portal for projects: energy, transport and logistics, telecoms, new technologies, critical minerals — not only subsoil, whatever we like to tell ourselves. The door has been open for nine months, with a sign, an address and an application form. By 3 September more than three hundred projects had been submitted, over sixty per cent of them energy. One was approved. None has been financed.

That is not the Americans failing to hear us. It is our own deputy minister's assessment: most of the projects are raw, without detailed justification or calculations. The Kinder manufacturer did not explain to the American regulator that it was being unfair. It looked at the requirement and rebuilt the product until it fitted. We send three hundred applications and take offence.

And the worst figure in this block. The fund's starting capital is $150 million, seventy-five American and seventy-five ours. One day of this war costs us $190 million. The whole fund everyone talks about is smaller than a single day of our war. It still matters, because when the US Treasury Secretary announced that one approved investment he said something precise: both the American and the Ukrainian economy can win from this partnership. He did not say we will help you. He said we both win.

One more mistake we make again and again: we build relations with a surname. Obama. Biden. Trump. America is much larger than the White House, and a good relationship with the United States has to survive American elections. Otherwise it is not a relationship with America. It is a relationship with the current tenant of the Oval Office.

What Ukraine needs is for its stability to be necessary to the world for reasons beyond the moral ones. To become important enough to European energy, American technology, AI, defence, logistics and capital that investing here is not charity but a good deal. The manufacturer understood the rules, changed the construction, and went back on the shelf. Ukraine needs a far more complicated construction, but the principle is the same. Being right is not enough. You have to build a system in which your partner needs you to succeed.

This argues for something that is being built.