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ANNA BON

Energy.

A Licence, Signed in an Evening

By
Anna Bon
Category
Energy
Form
Essay
Length
21 min read
Published
2026-10-11

A country that has spent more than four and a half years at war with its neighbour, and holds the rest of the world hostage to a nuclear button, has just offered to rescue the world economy.

Not with peace. Not by stopping the shelling. With diesel. And the door opened.

On 9 October the US Treasury issued a licence: Russian diesel may be sold into America until 7 April 2027, around the sanctions. Moscow began lifting its own export ban the same day. Six months of market access were arranged in an evening. Security guarantees for Ukraine have been drafted for years.

The sequence is worth setting down in order. The birthday Trump opened the call by marking was 7 October. That day a Russian missile killed twenty-two people in Pryluky, five of them children. On 8 October a guided bomb hit two buses at a stop in Kramatorsk; the latest count is thirty-three dead. On 9 October the President of the United States wished Putin a happy birthday and announced the diesel deal. Putin's aide noted separately that Russia's war aims have not changed.

So what exactly is the licence for? And if Putin gets the market before the war ends, what does he need peace for?

The feed has already answered: America sold Ukraine for diesel, the West signed a pact with the devil. It sounds good, which is why it bothers me. When the conclusion is ready before anyone has read the document, that is not analysis. It is an emotion somebody wants to sell you, and it is being sold from three directions at once. The Kremlin sells Putin as the saviour of the world economy. The White House sells cheap diesel before an election. And some of our own commentators sell you despair.

We do not know the whole truth; it sits in intelligence files and in recordings none of us has heard. But some of it can be established. It takes a few calls to people who trade this fuel every day, and a careful reading of the licence itself rather than of its retelling in the news.

I will start with the people who know most about devils. Violinists. Tartini dreamt that he sold his soul, and the devil took up his violin and played something that stopped his breath. He woke, rushed to write it down, and produced the Devil's Trill. The sonata is a masterpiece. He said for the rest of his life that it was nothing like what he had heard. The devil always sounds better in the promise than in reality.

Open the calculator on your phone. Trump named 300,000 tonnes immediately, 500,000 in November, a million after that, and three million more depending on the state of Russia's refineries. Three hundred thousand tonnes is about 2.2 million barrels. America burns roughly 3.8 million barrels of diesel and similar fuel a day. The first tranche does not cover a single day. Even all 4.8 million tonnes would last about nine days of American consumption, and the EIA expects high diesel prices into the end of next year. One American analyst noticed why the figures were given in tonnes rather than barrels. Tonnes sound more substantial.

Then I opened the document. There is no volume limit in it at all. Trump talks about 4.8 million tonnes; the paper permits any transaction in Russian diesel until April 2027. And it is a permission, not a contract: nobody has bought anything yet. It is also the first diesel licence since the full-scale invasion to run longer than the standard thirty days. In big politics even principles sometimes carry an expiry date. This one expires on 7 April 2027.

Why now? Because the American election is on 3 November. A gallon of diesel averaged almost $6.30 in September against about $3.70 a year earlier, and the farmer, the trucker and the builder see that difference at every pump. The strategic reserve is at its lowest since 1982. A week earlier, a forecast on Washington Week gave the Democrats a 93 per cent chance of taking the House and 74 per cent of the Senate. It is a model, not a result — American voters have surprised pollsters before — but the election is under a month away, diesel is at a record, and this is the week the cheap-diesel news appears.

For Russia the deal is about a market. For Trump it is about an election. For us it is about survival. While Washington counted cents on a gallon, Kramatorsk counted the dead at a bus stop.

In September I wrote that this autumn our war would be measured, for an American, by the price at the pump. That read as a forecast. It is now a Treasury licence.

The point is not to guess Trump's motives. The point is to understand how the American electoral calendar changes what Ukraine can negotiate. After 3 November the balance in Washington may be different, and the conversation will no longer be with the White House alone but with a new Congress.

I see how much anger there is. I wanted to write a few words Facebook would not publish. But Trump is not counting our emotions; he is counting votes in Ohio and Texas, and anyone who wants to change something has to understand what he is counting. In politics, as in a household, you can speak beautifully for as long as you like. If you do not bring bread home, the household eventually falls apart. Trump brings bread to his voters, by every available means. I disagree with many of those means. But taking offence at an American president for feeding his own household first is unprofessional. Our job is to get our security into that basket.

Energy used to look simple: whoever had more wells was in charge. Not any more. The head of Kuwait's state oil company said something in London this week that sounds odd at first. There is plenty of crude. What is missing is refined fuel — nearly six million barrels a day of it. The world has oil and no diesel. Like a bakery with plenty of flour and a broken oven. Crude still has to be refined, shipped and insured, and politics now stands at each of those three steps.

Our strikes did their work. By the IEA's estimate, a Russian refinery was hit on average once every three days through the first eight months of this year. Three of Russia's six largest diesel plants are stopped or running at about a quarter. June saw the lowest refining volumes in over twenty years. On 8 July Moscow banned exports. Then it started buying.

A country that sold diesel to half the world now brings it in from Belarus — 418,000 tonnes in seven months, almost seven times last year — and over 176,000 tonnes from South Korea across July and August, part of it on sanctioned tankers. In August alone Russia imported 368,000 tonnes of petroleum products by sea, seven times the July figure. And this is the Russia now promising to rescue America with diesel. It is like borrowing sugar from a neighbour and opening a confectionery with him. When someone offers me a deal like that, the first thing I ask to see is the warehouse.

The calendar is its own argument. 25 September: Peskov says Russian diesel will fill the world market, just lift the sanctions. 1 October, at Valdai: Putin says there is enough diesel but sanctions keep it off the market. 9 October: the licence. The shortage was created mainly by our drones. Putin sold it. He presented the lifting of his own export ban to Trump as a favour, in exchange for sanctions relief and without any public commitment to stop the war.

In the same September post I wrote that before November the result would go to whoever came to Trump with a finished product rather than a request. Putin came with a product. We still come with requests. His licence took a day.

This is what a failure of systematic negotiation looks like. First in the economy: Russia got market access, we got sympathy. The front always follows the economy. Tax on that diesel goes into the same budget Russia pays for missiles from — including the one that landed in Pryluky. Every day of this war costs us about $190 million. Nine days of diesel for America. Nine days of war for us is over one billion seven hundred million.

There is a rule in music: the same note sounds different in different halls. The acoustics decide. We make a mistake here. For us, strikes on Russian refineries are a way to weaken the aggressor. The American voter sees fuel getting more expensive and wants to know why. If we do not explain the economic case for Ukrainian action in his terms, the Russians will do it for us. We are playing the right notes, but only to our own hall.

Meanwhile Brazil happened, and almost nobody wrote about it. One of the world's largest diesel buyers took mostly Russian fuel for years: 47 per cent last year, and still 61.5 per cent against America's 38.4 as late as June. In July it inverted — the United States 65.9, Russia 25.6. Across July and August together American refiners supplied 68 per cent of Brazilian imports. Did our drones alone do that? No: prices, freight, sanctions and traders' decisions all moved. But Russia closed its exports after the new Ukrainian strikes, and the Brazilian market went to American plants. And now Washington is signing a fuel deal with Moscow that opens the door back.

Has anyone explained that to Americans in their own language? Here is the market your refiners won. Here is what you lose if you hand it back.

Europe should look closely too. In August the EU took half its imported diesel from the United States. On 1 October Washington demanded that Germany and France open emergency reserves, threatening to restrict its own exports otherwise; within days the G7 agreed to release 100 million barrels. Europe spent years talking about strategic autonomy, and now the fuel in its own reserves is a subject of negotiation with Washington. And while Washington opens a market to Russia, Brussels prepares a twenty-second sanctions package. Two shores of the Atlantic, two different prescriptions for one illness.

Diesel is the visible part. Underneath it the world order is being rewritten by whoever controls energy, routes and money. Lukoil's foreign assets, roughly $20 billion, are already on the table; by the New York Times' account an American state investment corporation may take a share alongside investors from Abu Dhabi and Qatar. American and Russian envoys have discussed an American investor entering Nord Stream. The coming peace already has shareholders. American, Russian, Qatari, Emirati. There are no Ukrainians among them.

A few years ago people smiled at phrases like the economic front. The trenches have not gone anywhere, and our soldiers hold them. But for several years now neither side has been able to settle this war on the battlefield the way it planned. The centre of gravity has shifted to refineries, grids, banks, licences and servers. A strike on a refinery changes diesel supply on another continent. A Treasury licence opens a market. This is not a separate economic war instead of the real one. It is the same war, with the economy as one of its battlefields.

Which brings the question that worries me more than today's headlines. Suppose America cuts support because it needs cheap diesel and calm before an election. Suppose Europe takes cheaper energy, some of it Russian again. Ukraine is left with its own budget and its dependence on imported components. What then?

Our drones fly in a way the whole world now studies. Our engineers do in weeks what takes others years. But a drone does not run on patriotism. It needs batteries, motors, electronics, communications. A plant needs power, wages and money for procurement — not once, but every day, next month, next year.

So I ask duller questions than the headlines. How many months could we finance critical defence production ourselves if external support shrank? What share of the key components in our drones is actually made in Ukraine rather than assembled here? How many protected power plants, links and servers do our defence plants need to keep working under fire? There are almost no honest public answers. That may be the most alarming figure in this text: the one we do not know.

After the first strikes on Kyiv's data centres I wrote for UNIAN that data centres had become critical state infrastructure, like power plants. Yesterday the war was about oil. Today it is about servers. On 1 October the Parkovy data centre in Kyiv stopped completely after a strike. On 8 October a Ukrainian drone hit Yandex's data centre in Sasovo, which holds two of the three supercomputers the company trains its AI on; it still cannot say whether the equipment can be restored. Russia hits our servers to cut our communications. We hit the servers it trains its artificial intelligence on. States used to argue about who owned the oil underground. Now they argue about who will own compute — and that comes back to energy. A data centre without electricity is a very expensive warehouse of metal.

I work with capital, investors and energy every day. Money is half of this world; medicine, schools, weapons and the light in your home all start there, and anyone who pretends politics is not about money simply loses to the people who are counting. But I am also a mother and a violinist, and the other half does not price. A child who can tell a Shahed from a missile by ear does not price. A concert in a shelter where people cry because the music is still alive does not price. Those five children in Pryluky do not price.

Deals are counted in dollars. We count our losses in names.

So who is the devil here? The casting is crowded. Or is the devil precisely the moment a human life leaves the calculation?

When I wrote that Washington has to be addressed in the language of interests, some objected that America is an ally, not a corporation. This deal is the answer. Washington is not betraying and not rescuing. It is buying what helps it today. But I also wrote that relations with America cannot be built around one surname, and that cuts both ways. Three weeks ago Trump signed the Graham sanctions bill that eighty-six senators voted for. The diesel licence runs against its whole spirit, and Democrats and Republicans in Congress have already said so publicly. The American refiners who won the Brazilian market have no interest in giving it back either. Those are our natural allies in America, and they are the ones to talk to.

We have every right to be angry, to criticise partners, to ask uncomfortable questions. After Pryluky and Kramatorsk, silence would be strange. But there is a wide gap between outrage and strategy. Taking offence at the whole of America is easy. Working out who took the decision, who disagrees with it inside Washington, and what we can put on the table instead is much harder.

And it is worth remembering who else reads our emotional statements. For years the Kremlin has been telling the world that Ukrainians are unpredictable and dangerous. Every hysterical line about Western betrayal is a ready-made quotation to be shown tomorrow in Berlin, Rome and Texas. If we keep speaking to partners in the language of grievance, we risk being seen exactly as Moscow paints us: not an ally to negotiate with, but a problem to manage. That does not mean staying quiet or agreeing with everything. America can be addressed directly and even bluntly — with facts, figures and an offer on the table. Partnership is not an obligation to always agree. It is the ability to survive a serious disagreement and keep working.

So the question is not why they do not love us. The question is what Ukraine is offering America today. What did we offer? Subsoil, and it is still unclear whether we got a fair price. Combat experience. Battlefield data we share to be liked. But military experience is not a souvenir brought to a conference. It was paid for in lives. Who set its price? Russia came to Washington with goods and got a deal. We came with sympathy, and sympathy does not sell on an exchange.

I would put three things on that table. A mirrored energy truce: Russia does not hit our energy, we do not hit its refineries; diesel flows, the American pays less; if Moscow breaks it, everything reverts automatically. It has to be sold as a benefit to the American voter, not as our request. The Brazilian and European figures, in Congress and in the American press — Representative Don Bacon has already said buying Russian fuel is no solution, and people like him need arguments in dollars, not in emotions. A Ukrainian share in post-war energy and digital infrastructure: American gas already enters Ukraine through the Vertical Corridor from Greece via Bulgaria and Romania, and our storage, our plants and our future data centres can be part of an American business for decades. Then a stable Ukraine is an asset to America rather than a line of expenditure.

The President called this deal a birthday present for Putin. After Pryluky and Kramatorsk it is hard to call it anything else, and emotionally I agree. But emotions belong in the kitchen. At a negotiation you show figures. An energy truce would be good. Real peace is when people stop dying, and it is bitter that the world has learned to agree about diesel faster than about a human life.

Perhaps the problem is not only that the world has grown more cynical. Perhaps we have not yet learned to explain well enough why a strong Ukraine is not a charity project for the West but a shared strategic interest. We cannot make anyone forget their own interests. Building a system of agreements in which our partners' interests work for Ukrainian security rather than against it — that is the task. It takes knowing what others need, where their interests meet ours, and what deal can be put on the table tomorrow that is harder to refuse than to accept.

And yes, we need a miracle — but not the kind awaited from other capitals. Our own economic miracle, which starts with our own energy, our own power plants, our own data centres and our own capital. The devil does not arrive with horns. He arrives with an attractive offer, beautiful music, and a contract where the important part is in small print. John Perkins called such visitors economic hit men. They do not shoot. They wait patiently until you cannot live without them. Missiles did not break us. Dependency can.

This argues for something that is being built.